A surprising connection on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The chance to earn around £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of political analyses for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or “insider” information. Payment in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s influential Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their operations on the internet.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director said Chinese agents were approaching Britons on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, seeking governmental, commercial, military and scientific secrets. But a new campaign aimed at elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legal Changes
In the typical style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from the agency or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out more information from within parliament, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service wants public figures to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, though the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a charge they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity face significant criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if a person participates in behavior that could potentially “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, however, is what China has to achieve. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on matters such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export information gathering techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, engaging 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, said it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is willing to cultivate contacts over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is considered to be useful,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis informed parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may result in an individual rapidly marginal turning significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless activities at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the international competition between China and the west at a threshold below the point of outright war. The nation has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation breach of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in persistent attempts to find covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to display influence and because it has the capability.